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Climate change is a growing concern among scientists, businesses, and the public at large (Pan, 
Ballot, & Fontane, 2013).  The consensus of scientists is that the use of fossil fuels has a direct 
and detrimental effect on the environment.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) reports that it is extremely likely that human activities, such as those that result in fossil 
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fuel emissions, are increasing concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere, contributing to global 
warming (IPCC, 2013).  Since the 1990s, governmental agencies have increasingly turned to 
market based cap and trade programs to control the emission of pollutants.  Cap and trade 
programs have gained favor with both governing bodies and regulated organizations because 
such programs enable parties to choose among a variety of mechanisms to achieve regulatory 
compliance (Majumdar & Marcus 2001).  These mechanisms include the reduction of emissions 
through operational improvements as well as the attainment of compliance through the open 
market acquisition of emissions allowances.  While emissions reduction efforts may eliminate 
the need for some firms to acquire additional allowances, other firms will have emissions levels 
that require the purchase additional allowances on the open market.  This study presents a new 
forward buying heuristic, designed for those firms that need to purchase emissions allowances 
via auctions, which reduces the impact of emissions allowance acquisitions on the firms’ 
financial performance.  This matter is of great importance to firms subject to cap and trade 
regulation, because they are faced with the operational challenge of developing cost effective 
environmental strategies in business environments where it often is difficult to pass compliance 
costs onto customers (Schofield, 2013).   
In cap and trade programs, a total emissions volume cap is set by a regulatory authority, 
which then issues a number of allowances (often in the form of certificates) corresponding to that 
total emissions volume cap (in most programs, one allowance authorizes the emission of one ton 
of a targeted pollutant) (Chaabane, Ramudhin, & Paquet, 2012).  Regulated firms then are 
required to obtain allowances equivalent to the volume of a pollutant they emit through 
operational activities or else pay a severe penalty.  A primary motivation of cap and trade 
programs is that the costs to acquire allowances are substantial enough that firms choose to avoid 
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the compliance costs and instead invest in efforts to permanently eliminate emissions. However, 
in many industries, zero emissions operations may be unattainable; in which case firms will need 
to acquire allowances for any remaining emissions.  Allowances are acquired in several ways: 
they are allocated by the regulatory authority to firms free of charge (a process known as 
grandfathering), purchased via auction, or traded between firms on the open market.  Allowances 
typically can be “banked” by a firm and held for use in future periods (EPA, 2002).  Allowances 
are also highly fungible; therefore firms can easily sell excess certificates on the open market, 
which can contribute directly to profitability (Zhang & Xu, 2013). 
The task of developing cost-effective production and allowance procurement programs is 
complicated by dramatic fluctuations in the market prices of emissions allowances.  For 
example, since the inception of the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 
which is one of the most recognized emissions reduction programs, the auction price for CO2 has 
ranged from a high of more than €30.00 per allowance to a low of €0.01 per allowance.  In 
situations such as these, price fluctuations (combined with the limited ability to pass the costs 
onto consumers) create a problem in which firm profits can fluctuate even when the selling price 
of the finished product, material and labor inputs, and customer demand are stable.   
For firms that need to acquire additional allowances via auction, this study presents a 
flexible heuristic that can be used by firms operating under any existing or future market based 
cap and trade regulatory program.  The intention of the study is not to develop or challenge the 
regulatory policies of the various cap and trade programs but rather the study presents a tool for 
firms to use when the existence of an auction based allowance market is an externality with 
conditions beyond the influence of individual firms.  Specifically, this paper examines the 
feasibility of applying an extended version of a Newsvendor heuristic to the emissions allowance 
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procurement and production problem.  This approach is motivated by the similarity between 
scenarios in which firms are impacted by market price fluctuations of emissions allowances and 
scenarios in which manufacturing firms are required to procure commodity raw materials 
through spot markets.  In the extant Operations Management literature, two primary approaches 
have been developed to address the commodity procurement problem.  In one approach, 
multiperiod order quantities are secured at favorable market prices via contracts (Sethi, Yan, & 
Zhang, 2004).  In the other approach, forward buying heuristics procure materials for future 
periods’ demand when the purchase price differential (current versus future) will outweigh the 
costs of holding the material as inventory (Golabi, 1985).  Both of these approaches have been 
shown to reduce acquisition costs by taking advantage of drops in spot market prices; however, 
the forward buying approach is more appropriate for the emissions allowance procurement 
problem. This is because the contractual approach often requires third parties to act as allowance 
brokers; a practice which is not permitted under some cap and trade programs (such as the EU 
ETS) which mandate that firms purchasing allowances must have the intention of actually using 
them for their own operations (European Union, 2010).  Recently, several forward buying 
heuristics have been developed that utilize the Newsvendor model to improve the effectiveness 
of commodity procurement programs (Gavirneni & Morton, 1999; Manikas, Chang, & Ferguson, 
2009).  Similarly, where firms are required to acquire emissions allowances on the open market, 
a strategy to forward buy allowances when market prices are favorable and bank the allowances 
as “inventory” for use in future periods may reduce a firm’s compliance costs.  The procurement 
and disposition of emissions allowances differs from commodity purchases primarily because no 
physical item is bought, stored, or may deteriorate.  In addition, commodity purchases require 
lead-time considerations for delivery of the commodities prior to use.  As noted in Manikas, 
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Chang, & Ferguson (2009), commodity purchases may be limited to firms that can procure the 
required minimum quantities.  Emission allowance purchases do not have minimum or multiple 
purchase and selling quantities, allowing all firms to benefit from forward buying of them.  
Ultimately, this study demonstrates that an enhanced Newsvendor model for emissions 
allowance forward buying and current period production planning can increase firm 
performance. 
The next section discusses the theoretical basis for this study.  The third section presents 
the proposed heuristic.  The fourth section describes the simulation conducted using empirical 
emissions allowance market data to test the effectiveness of the new heuristic. The fifth and sixth 
sections respectively present the results of the simulation and the managerial insights of the 
study.  The final section summarizes the study’s conclusions. 
2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
The U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP) was the first fully implemented cap and trade emissions 
regulation system (Kroes, Subramanian, & Subramanyam, 2012).  The program, which focuses 
on reducing the emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) generated during electricity production, has 
utilized cap and trade regulation successfully to reduce emissions by 67% compared to 1980 
levels (EPA, 2009).  Firms regulated by the ARP complied with the program’s emission 
restrictions by either acquiring allowances to offset their emissions or reducing their emissions 
levels.  The ARP’s successful reduction of pollutant emissions through the use of cap and trade 
has spawned a number of similar regional, national, and international programs, including the 
California Cap and Trade Program, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
and the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme; all of which focus on reducing CO2 emissions 
(Marcacci, 2013; Ranson & Stavins, 2012).   
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The EU ETS, which is the most mature of the currently enacted international CO2 cap 
and trade programs, provides an example of the likely format for future regulations.  The 
program established a carbon market in its first phase (2005 to 2007); however, the number of 
freely allocated allowances exceeded the demand, and the allowance market price dropped to 
essentially zero.  Despite a 6.5% reduction in the total emissions cap in the EU ETS’s second 
phase (2008 to 2012), the market price of allowances again dropped substantially due to reduced 
demand resulting from the global economic recession.  At the beginning of 2013, the EU ETS 
entered its third phase, in which the free allocation of allowances is being replaced gradually by 
auction markets as the primary mechanism for allowance acquisition (European Union, 2013).  
CO2 allowance auctions now occur several times each week, making the open market acquisition 
of allowances relatively straightforward for regulated entities (by contrast, SO2 allowance 
auctions occur only once per year under the ARP (EPA, 2002)).  During 2013, the percentage of 
allowances acquired via auction represented over 40% of the total number of issued allowances 
(European Union, 2014).  Correspondingly, during this phase of the EU ETS, the total emissions 
cap will be decreased by 1.74% annually until 2020 (European Union, 2008).  At the initiation of 
this study, the EU ETS CO2 allowance market has steadied as prices during this phase have 
remained relatively stable compared to the precipitous drops experienced during the first two 
phases (IntercontinentalExchange, 2013). 
A key tenant of cap and trade systems is that all players are required to purchase 
emissions allowances on regulated open markets.  The transparency of the market based system 
reduces the likelihood that one player may gain an advantage from information asymmetry.  The 
EU ETS explicitly prohibits participants from taking any actions to manipulate the market. 
Specifically, the EU ETS requires that emissions allowance purchases must be legitimate and 
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based on defensible production estimates for the firm, i.e., a firm may not arbitrarily buy an 
unlimited number of allowances in an attempt to influence the market (European Union, 2010). 
Cap and trade programs incorporate mechanisms that gradually increase the scarcity of 
allowances to achieve lasting, sustainable emissions reductions (European Union, 2013).  One of 
the most common mechanisms is a gradually reduced total emissions cap.  Additionally, while 
most cap and trade programs (including both the ARP and the EU ETS) initially distribute a 
portion of allowances to regulated firms free of charge (commonly referred to as grandfathering), 
the percentage of free allowances usually is decreased over the course of these programs to also 
increase the scarcity of allowances.  For example, firms impacted by the U.S. Acid Rain Program 
were freely allocated allowances equal to approximately 85% of the firms’ historical emission 
levels’ released during a baseline period. However, new emissions sources that have come online 
after the start the program are not allocated any free allowances (US EPA, 2010). Similarly, 
firms impacted by the EU ETS were initially freely allocated 80% of the firm’s allowance 
requirement at the beginning of Phase 3 of the program in 2013. However, the number of freely 
allocated allowances is decreasing annually so that grandfathering will only cover 30% of a 
firm’s requirement in 2020  (European Commission, 2014).  Subsequently, as the emissions 
allowances become scarcer, the market prices of allowances are expected to increase over the 
long run, triggering further investments in process improvements (European Union, 2013).  
However, in the short run, other factors, including the state of regional and global economies, 
can lead to fluctuations in the demand for allowances, which has been shown to impact the 
market prices of emissions allowances substantially.  These market fluctuations, similar to those 
experienced in many commodity markets, are a primary motivation of this study into the 
applicability of forward buying strategies to the emissions allowance procurement problem.  
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The practice of forward buying materials to take advantage of favorable pricing has been 
applied to a number of prior operational scenarios.  Two seminal works, Magirou (1982) and 
Golabi (1985), develop methods in which a material is purchased and held as inventory for future 
use when the material’s current price is low enough, compared to its forecasted future price, such 
that the cost savings resulting from purchasing the material and holding it as inventory offset the 
increased holding costs.  A key difference between these two works is that Magirou limits the 
storage capacity of the material, and Golabi does not.  Golabi’s approach is used in this study 
because the allowances are not physical goods; hence, the allowance storage capacity is 
unconstrained.  Golabi’s method assumes that demand is deterministic when it compares the 
costs of purchasing a material when demand is realized versus the potential cost savings of 
purchasing a material and holding it as inventory until needed.  Manikas et al. (2009) address this 
limitation with their GOGA heuristic; GOGA utilizes Golabi’s method to determine the number 
of periods for which to forward buy and then applies a modification of Gavirneni’s (2004) 
Newsvendor model to determine the production level for the current period.  Gavirneni’s 
modified Newsvendor equation, which assumes stochastic non-perishable demand in the current 
period, considers the current purchase cost, the expected purchase cost, and the cost of holding 
overage units as inventory (rather than the salvage costs of scrapping the overage) to determine 
the optimal order up to level.  The combination of Golabi (1985) and Gavirneni (2004) used in 
GOGA has been shown to be effective at improving firm profits, though it is limited because it 
treats only the current period demand as stochastic (all future demand is assumed to be 
deterministic and purchase amounts for forward buys are set equal to the expected mean 
demand). 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at
International Journal of Production Economics, published by Elsevier.  Copyright restrictions may apply.  doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.09.010
9 
Ideally, a zero-emissions strategy is the optimal operational policy for firms attempting to 
minimize the impact of allowance cap and trade regulation on their businesses.  However, most 
firms are likely to adopt compliance strategies that combine emissions reductions with emissions 
permitted through the surrender of acquired allowances (European Union, 2013).  For these 
firms, this study proposes that an advanced Newsvendor based allowance acquisition and 
production strategy, developed from existing forward buying strategies, may lead to substantial 
cost reductions.
The use of a Newsvendor approach in this study is motivated by previous research efforts 
which have demonstrated that modified versions of the Newsvendor equation can be employed 
to improve environmental performance.  Raz, Druehl, andd Blass (2013) used this approach to 
assess the environmental impacts of product design innovation decisions.  Relatedly, Rosiþ and 
Jammernegg (2013) also utilize a Newsvendor approach to investigate economic and 
environmental performance in their examination of the impact of a decision to source a product 
domestically versus locally on transport related emissions.  To the best of this study’s authors’ 
knowledge, this effort presents the first Newsvendor based forward buying and production 
decision heuristic specifically designed to address the emissions allowance procurement 
problem. 
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PROPOSED HEURISTIC
Existing forward buying heuristics were designed for commodity procurement, which entails 
factors such as lead-time for shipping of the commodities, storage requirements, and holding 
costs.  Conversely, emission allowances are not physical objects, and may be bought and sold in 
any quantity with essentially zero lead-time delay from purchase to possession.  As a result of 
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these differences, existing commodity forward buying methods do not explicitly address 
production planning and emissions allowance management strategies for firms operating under 
cap and trade regulation.  This section discusses the details of the problem and the heuristic 
developed to address this situation. 
3.1 Problem Statement 
A firm operating under a cap and trade regulatory system must determine how many allowances 
to purchase during each planning period to offset the emission of a regulated pollutant (e.g., 
CO2).  The quantity of allowances to purchase must reflect the number of periods for which the 
firm is buying allowances, the ideal production quantity in each of those periods, and the 
available inventory of allowances.  A firm must first decide whether to buy more allowances 
than it requires in the current period to take advantage of anticipated allowance market price 
increases (i.e. forward buying).  For forward buying to occur, the expected price savings 
resulting from purchasing allowances and holding them until they are needed must outweigh the 
costs of holding allowances in “inventory” until needed.  However, in the case of allowances, the 
holding costs are essentially the costs of the capital invested in the allowances rather than 
traditional inventory carrying costs.   Next, the ideal production quantities in each period need to 
be determined based on demand forecasts, the product costs, and the costs of emissions 
allowances (that otherwise would be an externality) corresponding to the production quantity.  
Additionally, the free market nature of a cap and trade program means that firms need to decide 
if they should sell excess allowances when the allowance price in the next period is forecasted to 
drop below the current value of inventoried allowances.   
3.2 Assumptions 
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The proposed forward buying heuristic is designed for a general cap and trade regulatory 
scenario in which a firm is required to acquire and surrender allowances to offset pollutant 
emissions generated during the production of goods.  Two variations of the model are examined: 
one for perishable products and one for non-perishable products.  The heuristic does allow for 
the free allocation of a portion of the required allowances, even though this practice typically is 
limited in mature regulatory programs.  To this end, the following assumptions are made: 
Condition 1:   Finished goods demand is stochastic with a known distribution.   
Condition 2:   The purchase prices of emissions allowances exhibit market fluctuations 
beyond the influence of the firm.   
Condition 3:  Fabrication of finished good products must be done prior to realizing that 
period’s demand, and the period length is insufficiently long to produce 
additional sellable goods should demand exceed on-hand inventory.   
Condition 4:  The firm does not produce viable substitute products to fill demand; 
therefore, any unmet demand is filled by another player in the market (no 
backorders).  If unmet demand may be filled at any future time period 
without loss of goodwill or revenue the problem can be mathematically 
reduced to a Silver-Meal algorithm as done in ùeny÷it and Erol (2010). 
Condition 5:  Demand is independent between periods (i.e., because there are no 
backorders, demand in one period does not affect other periods.) 
Condition 6:  Pollutant emissions increase linearly with production quantity. 
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Condition 7:  Emissions allowances may be purchased or sold each period on open spot 
markets at the current auction market price. Allowances may also be 
acquired at zero cost through free allocation programs. 
Condition 8:  Each period, the emissions allowances that the firm owns are revalued at 
the average price paid for the allowances. 
Condition 9: Emissions allowance purchases are be legitimate and not made in an 
attempt to influence the market (European Union, 2010).  
3.3 Newsvendor Production Planning with Emissions Allowance Forward Buying 
The proposed heuristic builds on aspects of several previous buying methodologies (Gavirneni, 
2004; Golabi, 1985; Manikas et al., 2009).  At the beginning of each period, a variation of 
Golabi’s (1985) forward buying algorithm is applied to determine the number of periods for 
which to forward buy allowances.  Further, the holding cost in the modified version of Golabi’s 
equation is set to be the cost of capital only, as there is no physical product subject to shrinkage, 
damage, obsolescence, and perishability with emission allowances.  A modified Newsvendor 
equation then is used to determine the current production level.  In contrast to GOGA, which 
uses the expected mean demand to determine future requirements, when allowance forward 
buying takes place, the proposed heuristic reapplies the modified Newsvendor model to estimate 
the current and future emissions allowance requirements (which serve as the order up to level for 
allowance purchases).  Another key difference between GOGA and the proposed heuristic is that  
Table 1: Model Notation
Symbol  Description 
Ĳn The allowance threshold price in period n.  A decision is made to forward buy 
allowances for period n when the current spot market price for allowances is below 
Ĳn. 
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x The emissions allowance spot market price. 
F(x) The forecasted cumulative emissions allowance price distribution for each period. 
he The cost to hold an emissions allowance for one period.  
p The selling price of the finished good per unit to the end consumer. 
c The Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) per unit excluding the emissions allowance cost. 
s Salvage value for perishable inventory at the end of the period. 
A The order up to level for emissions allowances in the current period.  In each period, 
additional allowances are procured via the open market to bring the allowance 
inventory up to A. 
a The number of emissions allowances required to produce one unit of finished goods. 
e The cost to purchase the emissions allowances required to produce one unit of 
finished goods in period 0, the current period.  This amount is scaled to the number 
of FG units per allowance.  E.g., if producing 100 units produces 1 ton of CO2 and 
the market price of an allowance to emit one ton is $4.21, e will be $0.421. 
e  The expected cost to purchase the emissions allowances required to produce one unit 
of finished goods in period 1.  
hfg The finished goods holding cost for one period.  
g Goodwill cost of not fulfilling demand (per unit). 
n Number of periods beyond the current period to forward buy. 
yi The order-up-to level for period i (i=0,….n), where in period 0 the order-up-to level 
is the number of finished goods ready for sale.  For future periods, this term indicates 
the expected production level, which is not actually produced but rather is used to 
calculate the number of allowances to forward buy for future use in that period. 
1)  The inverse CDF of demand. 
D Realized demand for period 0. 
the new method allows a firm to sell excess allowances on the open market when the market 
conditions are favorable.  The heuristic, which is designated as Newsvendor Production Planning 
with Emissions Allowance Forward Buying (NPPAFB), is applied repeatedly at the beginning of 
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each planning period to a rolling planning horizon.  The stimulus for this approach originated 
from Easton and Rossin’s (1996) method, which evaluates a Newsvendor model each period 
while treating the planning horizon in a period as an “independent epoch.”  The notation for the 
models utilized in the NPPAFB heuristic is detailed in Table 1. 
As noted above, NPPAFB initially applies a modification of Golabi’s (1985) formulation 
that calculates a series of price thresholds, based on future commodity price forecasts and 
holding costs of emission allowances.  The thresholds determine the number of periods for which 
commodities will be forward bought. For CO2 allowances, the modified version of Golabi’s 
formulation is used to examine a forecast of emissions allowance future prices that is compared 
against the cost of capital invested in allowances that are held for use in future periods.   Golabi’s 
equation accounts for the likelihood that the next period purchase price will be less than the 
current price and the financial benefit of locking in the prior price minus the holding costs of one 
period.  The modification of Golabi’s equation ultimately calculates an emission allowance 
threshold price per unit such that buying ahead n periods is optimal.  Explicitly, equation (1) 
below uses the emissions allowance spot market price (x), a forecasted cumulative allowance 
price distribution for each period (F(x)), and the cost of capital for holding one emissions 
allowance for one period (he).  The price distributions (F(x)) are predictions of a future price 
distributions forecasted from historical prices.  A current allowance market price below Ĳn is a 
signal to forward buy allowances for future use in period n.
1
0
( ) ( )
n
n





   ³ ³   (1)
Next, NPPAFB applies a modification of the Newsvendor model to determine the 
finished goods order up to level in the current period, which dictates the number of emissions 
allowances required in the current period.  Although goods are produced only in the current 
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period, the Newsvendor model is reapplied to future periods to determine the expected 
production levels in those periods for which allowances are being forward bought (determined 
from [1]); this estimated production level is used to calculate the number of additional emissions 
allowances to procure in the current period and hold for future use.  This approach differs from 
GOGA, in which Manikas et al. (2009) simply procure the mean demand level for each of the 
future periods for which they are forward buying commodities.   
Two modified versions of existing Newsvendor models are used in the NPPAFB 
heuristic; one for a scenario in which the finished goods are non-perishable and can be held to 
meet future demand, and one for perishable goods that are discarded at the end of each period.  
The Newsvendor approach was selected because of the model’s ability to determine the optimal 
production and inventory levels, while ensuring the appropriate customer service levels that 
minimize costs (Rogers & Tsubakitani, 1991).  Gavirneni’s (2004) approach for non-perishable 
goods calculates the underage costs as the finished good’s unit selling price (p) minus the current 
unit cost (c), and the overage costs as the current unit cost (c) plus the cost to hold one unit in 
inventory for one period (hfg) minus the expected unit cost in the next period ( c ).  Gavirneni’s 
Newsvendor model, with notation to reflect finished good holding rather than commodity 





 § · ) ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹
       (2) 
This model is tailored to the emissions allowance scenario by additionally considering the cost of 
the emissions allowances required to produce one unit of finished goods (e), the expected 
allowance cost in the next period ( e ) and the unit goodwill costs (g).  Under some 
circumstances, goodwill may be set to zero, as it is difficult to quantify brand and customer 
effects beyond monetary options (free shipping, discounts, coupons, etc.).  Specifically, for non-
perishable goods, the underage costs are calculated as the unit selling price (p) minus the current 
unit cost (c) minus the unit emissions cost (e) plus the unit goodwill cost.  The overage costs are 
computed as the current unit cost (c) plus the cost to hold one unit in inventory for one period 
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(hfg) plus the unit emissions cost (e) minus the expected unit emissions cost in the next period ( e
C
).  These last two emissions terms account for the current versus expected purchase price of 
emissions allowances.  The holding cost for one unit of inventory takes into account the material, 
labor, and emissions costs used to produce that finished good.  The material and labor costs are 
assumed not to vary substantially from period to period, therefore, the formulation includes 
variable emissions costs ( e
C
) rather than variable material costs ( c
C
).  The modified Newsvendor
is expressed as: 
1
fg
p c e gy
p h e g
 § ·   ) ¨ ¸¨ ¸  © ¹
       (3)
For perishable finished goods that are discarded at the end of the period, NPPAFB 
employs a modified version of the traditional Newsvendor formula.  The finished goods holding 
costs and the expected cost of emissions allowances in the next period are no longer considered; 
however, the salvage value of the unsold finished goods is now considered.  The salvage value 
(s) may be zero, positive or negative (indicating a disposal cost for excess units at the end of the  
period).  The modified Newsvendor equation for perishable goods is expressed as: 
1 p c e gy
p s g
 § ·   ) ¨ ¸ © ¹        (4)
3.4 The NPPAFB Heuristic: Detailed Order of Events  
Within each period, NPPAFB follows the steps detailed below and in Figure 1 to determine the 
current period’s allowance procurement order-up-to-level and the production order-up-to-level: 
1. Forecast future emissions allowance prices through the end of the planning horizon to
be used in (1), (3) and (4), as appropriate.
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at 
International Journal of Production Economics, published by Elsevier.  Copyright restrictions may apply.  doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.09.010
17 
2. For the current period (period 0), calculate the order-up-to quantity y0 of finished
goods to produce and stock using (3) for non-perishable products or (4) for perishable
products.
3. Use (1) to calculate n, the number of additional periods for which emissions
allowances should be bought (i.e., n values greater than 0 represent a decision to
forward buy allowances for use against production emissions allowance requirements
in future periods).
If n > 0, for periods i=1 through n, calculate iy , the estimated production level in each future 
period, based on repeated application of (3) for non-perishable products or (4) for perishable 
products, which is used to estimate the quantity of allowances required for the expected 








 ¦ , which represents the total expected units of finished goods that will be
produced in the current period and the future periods for which allowances will be forward 
bought.  From Y, the emissions allowance order-up-to inventory level A is calculated using A = 
aY, which is rounded up to the nearest whole allowance, as partial allowances cannot be 
purchased. 
4. Any allowances obtained through free allocation programs (i.e. grandfathered
allowances) are added to the allowance inventory.
5. If the current inventory of allowances is less than A, buy the required additional
allowances on the spot market.
6. If the firm’s inventory of allowances is greater than A and the current average price
paid per allowance [minus one period’s cost of capital] is greater than the forecast for
next period’s allowance market auction price, sell all excess allowances on the spot
market.
If the current finished goods inventory is less than 0y , produce the finished goods required to 
bring the inventory up to 0y  and surrender the appropriate number of emission allowances to the 
regulatory authority. 
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Let D be the demand realized for the period.  Sell the minimum of D and 0y .  Unmet demand is 
lost.  Goodwill penalties, if any, are assessed for the unmet demand.  For non-perishable finished 
goods, the finished goods inventory position is decremented by min(D, 0y ). 
7. For perishable goods, each unsold unit of finished goods is salvaged or disposed
resulting in period ending inventory of zero.  For non-perishable goods, each
remaining unsold unit of finished goods incurs a holding cost based on the COGS and
the firm’s inventory carrying cost.  Each unused allowance incurs a holding cost
based on the average cost of the past allowance purchases (regardless if those units
may have been sold in a previous period) and the firm’s cost of capital.
Figure 1: NPPAFB: Order of Events
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4. EMPIRCAL EVALUATION OF THE HEURISTIC
Simulation is used to empirically test the effectiveness of the NPPAFB heuristic against three 
other planning methods for non-perishable and perishable finished goods.  The first method, 
designated as the Base method (BASE), represents a simplistic compliance and production 
planning system in which allowances are not forward bought and the finished goods production 
order up to level in a period is set at the mean expected demand.  The second method, designated 
as Newsvendor Production Planning (NPP), applies equation (3) for non-perishable goods or 
equation (4) for perishable goods at the beginning of each period to determine the production 
order up to level.  The production level then is used to calculate the number of emissions 
allowances required in the current period.  Like BASE, NPP does not forward buy emissions 
allowances.  Finally, NPPAFB is compared against the GOGA method which also incorporates 
allowance forward-buying but differs from NPPAFB in that the future allowance purchase 
volume is based on the expected mean demand (rather than a Newsvendor determined amount) 
and that the selling of excess allowances is not permitted.  The simulation results are used to 
compare the total profits and emissions allowance expenditures that result from the application 
of NPPAFB, BASE, NPP, and GOGA to scenarios incorporating a variety of business 
conditions. 
Three separate simulations are conducted using three distinct sets of allowance market 
price data: the first simulation utilizes actual data from the current phase of the EU ETS (Phase 
3), which began on January 1, 2013 and the last two simulations use hypothetical data models 
based on two divergent predictions for the EU ETS allowance price in 2020 – an upward 
trending price prediction of ~U(€18, €26) and a downward trending price prediction of 
~U(€0.01, €0.99)) per allowance (Committee on Climate Change, 2009).  Several factors 
contributed to the decision to focus on data related to the EU ETS.  First, despite the U.S. Acid 
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Rain Program’s comparative maturity, historical data from the Acid Rain Program is limited as 
the program conducts allowance auctions only once per annum, while the EU ETS conducts 
multiple auctions each week.  Next, the frequency of the EU ETS auctions allows firms to 
procure or sell emissions allowances with relative ease compared to the Acid Rain Program.  
Finally, the decision was made to include only actual data from Phase 3 of the EU ETS because 
of the CO2 market instability that occurred during the program’s prior two phases. 
4.1 EU ETS Phase 3 Actual Allowance Price Data 
At the time of this study, the Phase 3 EU ETS allowance auctions have been in operation 
from January 2, 2013 until February 12, 2014.  Therefore, NPPAFB is tested using the weekly 
emissions allowance prices over this 56-week period.  The weekly EU ETS CO2 allowance 
prices during Phase 3, depicted in Figure 2, show that that the market experienced some 
volatility during the sample period.  The initial allowance price of €6.69 per allowance was the 
peak market price experienced during the sample period.  Subsequently, the market price 
dropped to a low of €2.78 which was followed by an increase to €6.50 per allowance at the end 
of the sample period. 
4.2 Simulated Future EU ETS Allowance Price Data 
For each of the 10,000 simulated upward trending price and 10,000 downward trending 
price iterations within the last two simulation runs, a new hypothetical set of price data is 
bootstrapped using a random walk procedure.  The procedure starts with the February 12, 2014 
actual EU ETS allowance price and creates an additional 306 weeks of simulated price data out 
to January 2020.  To create a new week of simulated price data, the procedure starts with the 
previous week’s price and adds (or subtracts) a component calculated as the weekly straight line 
price trend from the actual allowance price on February 12, 2014 to the predicted prince in 2020  
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Figure 2: EU ETS Phase 3 Allowance Market Prices (January 2, 2013 to February 12, 2014)
Source: IntercontinentalExchange, 2014 
(either ~U(€18, €26) or ~U(€0.01, €0.99)) plus a random component ranging between -3 and +3 
standard deviations of the EU ETS Phase 3 prices variation exhibited between January 2013 and 
February 2014.  Examples of an upward trending price dataset and a downward trending price 
dataset are shown respectively in Panels A and B of Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Examples of Bootstrapped Datasets 
Panel A: Example of simulated upward trending allowance price data through January 2020 
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Panel B: Example of simulated downward trending allowance price data through January 2020 
4.3 Scenario Creation 
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Ten-thousand unique datasets are created for each of the three simulation runs. Each 
dataset contains a randomly generated mix of product conditions including Product Perishability 
(Yes / No), Product Cost ($ / unit), Product Selling Price ($ / unit), Product Goodwill ($ / unit), 
Emissions Allowances required (# / unit), Cost of Capital (%), Mean Demand (units) and 
Standard Deviation of Demand, which are held constant over an individual dataset’s time frame 
(i.e. 56 weeks in the first simulation and 306 weeks in the second and third simulations).  
Additionally, each perishable product dataset contains a randomly generated Product Salvage 
Value ($ / unit) that also is constant across the dataset’s time frame.  Additionally, for each 
dataset, the dataset’s mean and standard deviation of demand is used to randomly generate 
demand data for each week of allowance price data that is being tested (i.e. 56 weeks in the 
Phase 3 analysis and 306 weeks for both the upward and downward trending price runs).    The 
distributions of the simulation parameters are described in Table 2. 
The NPPAFB and GOGA heuristics each require a forecast of future allowance market 
prices to determine the forward buying price thresholds, which is computed using a variation of 
the simple linear forecasting method proposed by Chatfield (2000).  The forecast for the next 
period is calculated as Ft+1 = Įt + ȕt * t, where Įt is the local intercept based on the current 
allowance market price, and ȕt is the local slope, which is calculated using the two most recent 
data points.  A naïve forecast based on Ft+1  is used to determine the local intercept and slope for 
forecasts two or more periods out because the actual market data is not known for future periods.  
It is not suggested that this is necessarily the best possible allowance price forecasting method, 
but rather this method was selected due to its simplicity and ease of implementation. 
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Table 2: Parameter Distributions for Simulation Replications 
Variable Distribution 
Product Cost ($ / unit) ~U($1, $50) 
Product Selling Price ($ / unit) ~U(c + $25, c + $200) 
Product Salvage Value ($ / unit) ~U(-$10, c - $10) 
Product Goodwill ($ / unit)  ~U($0, p) 
Allowances Required (# / Finished Good Unit) ~U(0.2, 5) 
Cost of Capital (%) ~U(5%, 12%) 
Mean Demand (units) ~U(1000, 3000) 
Standard Deviation of Demand ~U(Mean Demand / 4, Mean Demand * ¾ ) 
In each simulation run, the NPPAFB, BASE, NPP, and GOGA heuristics each are 
applied to all of the 10,000 datasets.  Applying all four methods to each dataset eliminates the 
possibility that outlying datasets may skew the results of one of the methods.  The relative 
performance of the four heuristics is assessed by examining the emissions allowance purchase 
costs and the total profits generated within the three simulation runs.   
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results from the simulation tests of the four heuristics, detailed in Tables 3, 4, and 5, show 
that NPPAFB outperforms BASE, NPP, and GOGA for both non-perishable and perishable 
finished goods over a range of business conditions.  Paired sample T-Tests are used to 
statistically compare the four allowance acquisition methodologies.  Compared against all three 
methods, the simulation results show that the NPPAFB heuristic improves the overall  
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Table 3: Simulation Results – ETS Phase 3 Price Data 
Newsvendor Production 



















€ 11,598,614 € 8,119,509 € 11,527,850 € 11,569,729 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 





€ 3.96 € 4.62 € 4.64 € 4.54 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 






€ 13,464,054 € 8,233,396 € 12,490,659 € 12,545,614 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 





€ 3.95 € 4.62 € 4.64 € 4.55 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 
- (+17.2%)*** (+17.5%)*** (+15.2%)***
Significance vs. NPPAFB Method, *p< 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p< 0.001 based on a Paired Samples two-tail T-Test. 
1Average Allowance Effective Purchase Cost = ([Total Allowance Purchase Costs + Total Allowance Holding Costs – Total Allowance Sales 
Revenue] / [# of Allowance used for production]) 
Table 4: Simulation Results – Bootstrapped Data upward trend to 2020  
Newsvendor Production 
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€ 61,495,330 € 41,966,505 € 60,840,759 € 61,345,679 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 





€ 12.12 € 13.41 € 13.38 € 12.45 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 






€ 70,630,010 € 42,954,450 € 65,403,544 € 65,899,386 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 





€ 11.96 € 13.34 € 13.22 € 12.30 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) 
- (+11.5%)*** (+10.5%)*** (+2.8%)***
Significance vs. NPPAFB Method, *p< 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p< 0.001 based on a Paired Samples two-tail T-Test. 
1Average Allowance Effective Purchase Cost = ([Total Allowance Purchase Costs + Total Allowance Holding Costs – Total Allowance Sales 
Revenue] / [# of Allowance used for production]) 
Table 5: Simulation Results – Bootstrapped Data downward trend to 2020 
Newsvendor Production 


















Profit € 65,127,657 € 45,156,047 € 64,376,385 € 64,521,797 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) - (-30.7%)*** (-1.2%)*** (-0.9%)*** 
Average € 2.49 € 3.87 € 3.87 € 3.60 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at





(% Difference vs. 





Profit € 77,313,501 € 46,703,814 € 71,184,356 € 71,330,898 
(% Difference vs. 





€ 2.49 € 3.90 € 3.89 € 3.62 
(% Difference vs. 
NPPAFB) - (+56.4%)*** (+56.0%)*** (+45.3%)*** 
Significance vs. NPPAFB Method, *p< 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p< 0.001 based on a Paired Samples two-tail T-Test. 
1Average Allowance Effective Purchase Cost = ([Total Allowance Purchase Costs + Total Allowance Holding Costs – Total Allowance Sales 
Revenue] / [# of Allowance used for production]) 
profitability while reducing emissions allowance expenditures.  Due to the large sample size of 
each simulation group (n = 10,000, consisting of approximately 5,000 cases for perishable 
products and 5,000 cases for non-perishable products), the statistical power for each of the T-
Tests exceeds 99%. 
5.1 Impact on Profitability 
NPPAFB consistently generated higher profits compared to the three other methods. NPPAFB 
was superior to BASE, NPP, and GOGA respectively in 99.8%, 97.9%, and 84.4% of the tested 
datasets.  As described above, all four planning methods were applied to each dataset; therefore, 
paired samples T-Tests can be employed to statistically compare the performance of the three 
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heuristics.  These tests find that compared to NPPAFB, each of the three other methods generate 
statistically lower profits (p < 0.001) for both non-perishable and perishable products.  Compared 
to the simplistic BASE method, all three methods generate substantially higher profits for both 
product types, which reinforces the well-established advantage of Newsvendor based planning 
models.  Though the improvements in the profits generated by NPPAFB versus NPP and GOGA 
are significantly higher for both product types across all three allowance price simulations; the 
average improvement in profitability for non-perishable products amounts only to a difference 
ranging from 0.2% to 1.2%.  Comparatively, for perishable products, NPPAFB generates profits 
approximately seven percent higher than NPP and GOGA across all three simulations.  The 
superiority of NPPAFB’s performance for perishable products is likely because the per unit cost 
of finished goods are typically lower under NPPAFB due to the lower allowances costs which 
lowers holding costs compared to goods created using allowances purchased at higher market 
price points.  These lower costs in turn also increase the relative margin of incurred costs which 
are recovered when a perishable product is disposed of or salvaged. 
5.2 Impact on Emission Allowance Costs 
While NPPAFB does improve the profitability for firms operating under cap and trade 
regulation, its most managerially important impact is on the costs of emissions allowances.  As 
shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5, for both non-perishable and perishable finished goods in all three 
allowance price scenarios, the average per allowance purchase costs under BASE and NPP 
essentially are equal while the cost paid under GOGA (in which allowances are forward bought) 
tends to be slightly lower.  However, compared to all three of these methods, the effective cost of 
allowances under NPPAFB (which includes the holding costs and the revenue generated when 
market conditions dictate allowances to be sold) drops significantly (p < 0.001). 
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The ability of GOGA and NPPAFB to reduce the per unit allowance compliance costs 
compared to BASE and NPP is clearly a benefit of allowance forward buying.  Correspondingly, 
NPPAFB’s improvement relative to GOGA results from the NPPAFB’s incorporation of 
allowance selling.  This is supported by the results seen in the three market price simulations – 
the reduction in allowance cost is greatest in the downward trending allowance price simulation; 
which incorporates scenarios in which there is likely to be more selling of allowances under 
NPPAFB.  In line with this, the per allowance cost improvement under NPPAFB versus GOGA 
is the smallest in the upward trending price simulation, in which the least amount of allowance 
selling is likely to occur. 
5.3 Numerical Example 
Detailed carbon cost data for individuals firms is difficult to attain due to the infancy of carbon 
trading schemes; however the following example illustrates the potential impact of NPPAFB on 
a firm’s financial performance. In 2013, the electric utility Duke Energy Corporation was one of 
the largest emitter of CO2 in the United States. In that year, Duke Energy reported a net income 
of $2.7 billion on operations that emitted 136 million tons of CO2 (Duke Energy Corporation, 
2014a & 2014b). Assuming that the 2013 EU ETS CO2 allowances prices are representative of 
the prices that a hypothetical U.S. based system would experience, Duke Energy would have 
been required to incur an additional expense of $823 million to acquire the required allowances 
using a GOGA based buying strategy. The cost to acquire allowances would decrease to $715 
million if they instead used NPPAFB to acquire allowances. Presuming that the allowance 
expenditures directly impact Duke Energy’s net profits, the application of NPPAFB would 
improve the firm’s profitability $108 million during 2013 (a 5.9% improvement versus GOGA). 
In particular, this example highlights the impact that improved allowance acquisition strategies 
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can have on emissions intensive industries in which the costs of compliance are large relative to 
the profit margins. 
6. MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS
The results of this study show that under real world scenarios, the NPPAFB heuristic can be 
expected to decrease the costs of compliance and subsequently improve profitability for firms 
operating under cap and trade regulation.  From a practical standpoint, regulated firms should 
primarily strive to reduce and eliminate emissions to avoid the costs of emissions allowances 
(Gunasekaran & Spalanzani, 2012).  However, when firms have exhausted their ability to avoid 
emissions and must acquire allowances, they need to carefully develop a strategy that minimizes 
the impact of environmental compliance costs on their business performance. 
The simulation results show that the application of any of the three modified Newsvendor 
models to the production decision generates the majority of the improvement in profitability 
compared to the BASE method.  Although the NPPAFB does not necessarily dominate NPP and 
GOGA across all of the simulations from a profit perspective, the value of NPPAFB should not 
be discounted; the findings do show that in the majority of examined cases, across a variety of 
allowance price behavior scenarios, the additional actions permitted under NPPAFB significantly 
improves on the profitability and allowance costs generated by using either BASE, NPP, or 
GOGA.  These findings are particularly true for perishable goods. 
Specific to the proposed NPPAFB heuristic, firms need to consider if their emissions 
allowance needs are substantial enough to warrant the time and expense of managing a complex 
forward buying and selling program.  The assessment of whether a firm should employ NPPAFB 
should be based on a careful analysis of the specific conditions experienced by the firm.  First, 
the overall nature and volatility of the allowance market should be examined.  Particularly, it is 
important to note that while the emissions cost savings generated when NPPAFB sells 
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allowances on the market is greatest when market prices are trending downward, similar cost 
savings can be obtained in practically any scenario that includes several successive periods of 
declining prices.  Next, the specific characteristics of the regulated product need to be 
considered.  If the finished good in question is perishable, the results of the simulations show that 
the case for implementing NPPAFB over NPP or GOGA is stronger compared to that for non-
perishable products.  Additionally, the level of emissions generated in the production of a 
finished good should also be examined.  As the number of allowances per unit increases, the case 
for implementing NPPAFB becomes more compelling due to the expected reduction in the per 
unit allowance costs.  Conversely, if the emissions allowances required represent a trivial portion 
of a firm’s overall costs, a less complex procurement strategy might be more appropriate. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
This study has developed an innovative new heuristic, which combines a forward buying 
decision algorithm with modified Newsvendor formulations, to enhance emissions allowance 
procurement for firms that generate regulated pollutants as a byproduct of their finished goods 
manufacturing processes.  NPPAFB’s flexibility to accommodate both perishable and non-
perishable products assures that it can be applied to virtually any scenario in which a firm 
operates under a market based cap and trade regulatory program.  The results of the empirical 
simulations, which use actual allowance market data as well as two diverse simulations of 
possible market conditions, demonstrate that under a wide range of circumstances, NPPAFB 
significantly improves profitability and decreases allowance costs for firms that are required to 
acquire emissions allowances via open markets. 
The primary limitations of the NPPAFB model are that it relies on forecasted future 
emissions prices and the assumption that a product’s demand distribution is known. The two 
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most advanced methods examined in this study (NPPAFB and GOGA) both forward buy 
emissions using forecasted market prices – therefore substantial forecasting errors should 
similarly impact both methods. As seen in the results, NPPAFB and GOGA both significantly 
outperform the other two methods despite the use of a very simple forecasting method; a result 
that suggests that the benefits of using forecasted emissions prices outweigh the risks of 
forecasting errors.  Likewise, the assumption that demand distributions are known could be 
flawed if significant market disruptions were to occur.  However, it is expected that such market 
disruptions will have a similar impact on all of the tested methods as all four methods rely on 
predicted demand distributions to determine each period’s production level. 
Extensions to this study may enhance the ability of firms to develop effective operating 
strategies that comply with regulatory requirements.  First, as more programs are implemented 
worldwide, additional data, which can be used to test the robustness of NPPAFB, will become 
available.  Additionally, future research may examine more complex scenarios in which firms 
weigh the tradeoffs of compliance through investments in emission reducing process 
improvements versus the costs of advanced allowances acquisition programs. 
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